Speaker: Gilad Asharov, BIU
Title: Towards a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation
Abstract:
We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to
capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative
case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we
first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of
protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for
rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a
Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out
to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation based notion
that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing
cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be
met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably
impossible to achieve.
Joint work with Ran Canetti and Carmit Hazay.