Finding Incentives to Secure Internet Routing
Sharon Goldberg, Boston University
Abstract:
Despite a decade of research, the problem of securing the global
Internet's routing system is far from solved. The existence of viable
secure routing protocols makes it clear that this problem is not one
of technical feasibility, but one of incentives. Indeed, a key hurdle
for the transition to secure routing is the fact that the Internet
consists of thousands of autonomous systems (e.g. backbone providers
like AT&T, content providers like Google, business networks like Bank
of America), that will make deployment decisions according to their
own local business objectives. Worse yet, the security benefits
provided by secure routing protocols tend not to kick in until they
have adopted by a large number of autonomous systems. As a result,
the conventional wisdom argues that global deployment of routing
security is infeasible.
This talk overviews a series of our results that challenge this
conventional wisdom. We shall use both theoretical arguments and
simulations to show how local incentives can be harnessed to secure
the majority of autonomous systems in the Internet. No background
will be assumed.
Based on joint work with Phillipa Gill (Toronto), Pete Hummon(AT&T),
Zhenming Liu (Harvard), Jen Rexford (Princeton), and Michael Schapira
(Princeton/HUJI).
Bio:
Sharon Goldberg is an assistant professor of computer science at
Boston University. Her research focuses on finding practical solutions
to problems in network security, by leveraging formal techniques from
cryptography, algorithms, and game theory. She obtained her PhD from
Princeton University in July 2009, and her BASc from the University of
Toronto in June 2003.