GTACS

In a continual memory leakage attack, we consider a cryptosystem which updates its secret state at the end of each execution. An adversary attacking the system can learn arbitrary, but bounded, leakage on its secret state between any two successive updates. The public parameters of the system do not change during updates. Several basic cryptographic primitives, including public-key encryption and signatures, resilient to such attacks are now known.

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are increasingly being proposed as central building blocks in cryptographic protocols and security architectures. The SRAM-based PUF is a proposed implementation of this primitive which reuses the existing memory of the underlying device and thus enjoys a very low implementation overhead.

please confirm your participation by midday on Monday June 17 by sending an email to Yonit:

We build on an approach of Kiltz et al. (CRYPTO ’10) and bring new techniques to bear on the study of how “lossiness” of the RSA trapdoor permutation under the $\Phi$-Hiding Assumption ($\Phi$A) can be used to understand the security of classical RSA-based cryptographic systems. In particular, we show that, under $\Phi$A, several questions or conjectures about the security of such systems can be reduced to bounds on the regularity (the distribution of the primitive $e$-th roots of unity mod $N$) of the ``lossy'' RSA map (where $e$ divides \Phi(N)).

Title: Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments via Linear Interactive Proofs
Speaker: Alessandro Chiesa (MIT)

Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) enable verifying NP statements with lower complexity than required for classical NP verification. Traditionally, the focus has been on minimizing the length of such arguments; nowadays researchers have focused also on minimizing verification time, by drawing motivation from the problem of delegating computation.

Abstract:

In this week's seminar, I will present the CRYPTO 2013 paper by Bellare-Hoang-Keelveedhi on "Instantiating Random Oracles via UCEs", where UCE stands for Universal Computational Extractor. This is a very interesting work (in my opinion) which formalizes what it means for a concrete function to behave like a random oracle. There have been some attempts at this in the past. However, this is the first attempt to achieve wide applicability. Specifically, many classic random-oracle constructions (but not all) can be proven secure using UCEs.

On Sunday, 2.2, we will hold the Lightweight Crypto Day 2014, dedicated to lightweight cryptography at the Caesarea Rothschild Institute at the University of Haifa.

The day will cover various aspects of lightweight cryptography (covering both academic and industrial view points to the matter), discuss the challenges that lightweight cryptography faces, and will serve as a meeting point for international and local experts from academia, industry, and standardization bodies.

We hereby invite you to the I-CORE (Center of Excellence in Algorithms) Day, which will be held in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and will have four parallel tracks, on the following research topics:

Cryptography and Security
Computer Networks
Algorithmic Game Theory
Algorithms and Computation

In addition we will have the following joint Plenary Speakers:

Prof. Chris Umans, California Institute of Technology

Prof. Luca Trevisan, Stanford University